Ke moral judgments (Young et al., 2010). Although there is a large amount of research indicating that the TPJ codes for our ability to mentalize, there is also evidence that the TPJ activates during attentional switching (Mitchell, 2008). In addition, one study revealed that patients with lesions to the TPJ do not show domain-specific deficits for false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007). Although these differential findings suggest that the specific functionality of the TPJ remains unclear, we propose that TPJ engagement during real and imagined moral BX795 price decisions suggests a similar mentalizing process is at play in both real and hypothetical moral decision-making: when deciding how much harm to apply to another, subjects may conscript a mental state representation of the Receiver, allowing them to weigh up the potential consequences of their decision. This neural finding reinforces the role of the TPJand thus the likely role of mental state reasoning and inferencein moral reasoning. However, we also found distinct neural signatures for both real and imagined moral decisions. In line with the literature, hypothetical moral decisions were specifically subserved by activations in the PCC and mPFCregions also implicated in prospection, by which abridged simulations of reality are generated (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Although the overall pattern of brain activation during these hypothetical moral decisions replicates the moral network identified in previous research (Greene et al., 2001), the fact that the PCC and mPFC are activated both during prospection and during hypothetical moral AZD0156 supplier decision-making implies that this region is recruited for a wide spectrum of imagination-based cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). Thus, either hypothetical moral decisions and imagination share a similar network or hypothetical moral decisions significantly rely on the imperfect systems of prospection and imagination. Further research exploring whether the PCC and mPFC are specific to hypothetical moral decisions, or recruited more generally for imagining future events, would help clarify their roles within the moral network. In contrast, real moral decisions differentially recruited the amygdala. These results are consistent with the vast literature implicating the amygdala in processing social evaluations (Phelps, 2006), emotionally relevant information (Sander et al., 2003) and salient stimuli (Ewbank et al., 2009). Research on moral cognition further implicates amygdala activation in response to aversive moral phenomena (Berthoz et al., 2006; Kedia et al., 2008; Glenn et al., 2009); however, this finding is not systematically observed in moral paradigms (Raine and Yang, 2006). In line with the literature, it is possible that in the Real PvG task the amygdala is coding the aversive nature of the moral decision; however, distress ratings indicated that both conditions were perceived as equally aversive. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation is that the amygdala is monitoring the salience, relevance and motivational significance (Mitchell et al., 2002) of the real moral choice space.SCAN (2012)O. Feldman Hall et al.SUPPLEMENTARY DATA Supplementary data are available at SCAN online. FUNDING This research was supported by the Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit.
Nattabi B et al. Journal of the International AIDS Society 2012, 15:17421 http://www.jiasociety.org/content/15/2/17421 | http://dx.doi.org/10.7448/IAS.15.2.Research arti.Ke moral judgments (Young et al., 2010). Although there is a large amount of research indicating that the TPJ codes for our ability to mentalize, there is also evidence that the TPJ activates during attentional switching (Mitchell, 2008). In addition, one study revealed that patients with lesions to the TPJ do not show domain-specific deficits for false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007). Although these differential findings suggest that the specific functionality of the TPJ remains unclear, we propose that TPJ engagement during real and imagined moral decisions suggests a similar mentalizing process is at play in both real and hypothetical moral decision-making: when deciding how much harm to apply to another, subjects may conscript a mental state representation of the Receiver, allowing them to weigh up the potential consequences of their decision. This neural finding reinforces the role of the TPJand thus the likely role of mental state reasoning and inferencein moral reasoning. However, we also found distinct neural signatures for both real and imagined moral decisions. In line with the literature, hypothetical moral decisions were specifically subserved by activations in the PCC and mPFCregions also implicated in prospection, by which abridged simulations of reality are generated (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Although the overall pattern of brain activation during these hypothetical moral decisions replicates the moral network identified in previous research (Greene et al., 2001), the fact that the PCC and mPFC are activated both during prospection and during hypothetical moral decision-making implies that this region is recruited for a wide spectrum of imagination-based cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). Thus, either hypothetical moral decisions and imagination share a similar network or hypothetical moral decisions significantly rely on the imperfect systems of prospection and imagination. Further research exploring whether the PCC and mPFC are specific to hypothetical moral decisions, or recruited more generally for imagining future events, would help clarify their roles within the moral network. In contrast, real moral decisions differentially recruited the amygdala. These results are consistent with the vast literature implicating the amygdala in processing social evaluations (Phelps, 2006), emotionally relevant information (Sander et al., 2003) and salient stimuli (Ewbank et al., 2009). Research on moral cognition further implicates amygdala activation in response to aversive moral phenomena (Berthoz et al., 2006; Kedia et al., 2008; Glenn et al., 2009); however, this finding is not systematically observed in moral paradigms (Raine and Yang, 2006). In line with the literature, it is possible that in the Real PvG task the amygdala is coding the aversive nature of the moral decision; however, distress ratings indicated that both conditions were perceived as equally aversive. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation is that the amygdala is monitoring the salience, relevance and motivational significance (Mitchell et al., 2002) of the real moral choice space.SCAN (2012)O. Feldman Hall et al.SUPPLEMENTARY DATA Supplementary data are available at SCAN online. FUNDING This research was supported by the Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit.
Nattabi B et al. Journal of the International AIDS Society 2012, 15:17421 http://www.jiasociety.org/content/15/2/17421 | http://dx.doi.org/10.7448/IAS.15.2.Research arti.